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Introduction
A defendant is brought to trial in a state criminal court. During
his trial, the defendant fails to abide by a state procedural rule mandating that a particular constitutional claim be raised at a specific point
during the judicial proceedings. The defendant is convicted and, on
appeal, attempts to raise the constitutional claim that he should have
raised at trial. The state supreme court finds that the defendant's violation of the state procedure bars him from asserting the constitutional
claim on appeal. On direct review, the Supreme Court of the United
States similarly declines to reach the merits of the constitutional claim
because it finds that the state procedure is an adequate and independent state ground precluding direct review. The defendant, now incarcerated in a state prison, files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a
United States district court based on the same constitutional claim he
attempted to raise on appeal. Is the defendant eligible for the writ and,
if so, under what circumstances?
This question was recently addressed in Wainwright v. Sykes,'
where the Supreme Court, following a path established by earlier Burger Court cases, sharply limited its suggestion in Fay v. Noia2 that such
a prisoner could obtain habeas relief unless he had "deliberately bypassed" the state procedural rule. The Court in Sykes held instead that
a state prisoner having committed a state procedural default 3 in raising
a Miranda claim was eligible for federal habeas relief only if he could
t In this Article, the authors, though recognizing that the feminine gender may be
equally appropriate, use the masculine gender for personal pronouns. This convention is
adopted for the purpose of style and consistency.
*
A.B., 1975, Yale University; J.D., 1978, University of Virginia.
**
A.B., 1974, Brown University; J.D., 1978, University of Virginia.
1. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
2. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
3. As the term is used in this Article, a "procedural default" means a defendant's
failure to raise a constitutional claim in accordance with a procedural rule that is sufficient
[16831
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demonstrate both "cause" for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with state procedures and "actual prejudice" arising from the constitutional claim. The Sykes Court, however, reserved for future
resolution the precise definition of the two prongs of the "cause-andprejudice" test.
This Article is an examination of the cause-and-prejudice test. It
begins with a brief overview of the Supreme Court jurisprudence culminating in Sykes and the issues left unresolved in that opinion. The
Article then explores three theoretical definitions of "actual prejudice"
and the lower court cases applying the term. This survey reveals that,
although courts have employed all three approaches, the vast majority
have utilized a variant of harmless-error analysis. The Article next explores the definition of "cause," with an emphasis on the question of
what, if any, attorney conduct constitutes a reasonable and valid explanation for failure to abide by a state procedural rule. Examination of
the cases reveals that the lower courts have divided sharply over what
type of attorney conduct constitutes cause, but that courts generally define cause most expansively when a habeas petitioner suggests the possibility of an unjust incarceration.
Historical Overview
The circumstances under which the failure of a state prisoner to
raise a federal constitutional claim in accordance with state procedures
will foreclose federal habeas review are different today than they were
in 1963 and were different in 1963 than they had been ten years earlier.
A brief overview of this changing Supreme Court jurisprudenc- and
the significant issues as yet unresolved provides a necessary backdrop
to this Article.
From Brown to Francis
4
It was not until 1953 that the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen
addressed the question of whether a state prisoner's noncompliance
with a state procedural rule would foreclose access to federal habeas
review. In Brown two state prisoners sought habeas review of constitutional claims that, although properly raised at trial, had been filed one
day late on appeal. Neither the state supreme court, which enforced
the filing deadline, nor the United States Supreme Court, which denied

to bar him, under an applicable waiver standard, from having the constitutional claim considered on its merits by a federal court on collateral review.
4. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

July 19791

WAINWRIGHT V. SYKES

a writ of certiorari, addressed the merits of these claims on direct appeal. Reviewing a subsequent request for a federal writ of habeas
corpus, the Supreme Court held that the state prisoners' failure to comply with the state filing deadline prevented them from seeking collateral relief in federal court on their constitutional claims.5 In reaching
this result, the Court in Brown suggested that an adequate and independent state procedural ground precluding direct review in the
6
Supreme Court also barred habeas review in federal district court.
This suggestion was abandoned a decade later in Fay v. Noia,7 a
case involving a habeas petitioner who, although having raised constitutional claims at trial, failed to appeal his conviction. The Court in
Fay ruled that "the doctrine under which state procedural defaults are
held to constitute an adequate and independent state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review is not to be extended to limit the
power granted the federal courts under the federal habeas statute."8
The Court further stated, however, that if a state prisoner had "deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts," 9 a federal
habeas court, as a matter of comity, retained "limited discretion" to
hold that the prisoner had "forfeited," or waived, his right to federal
habeas review. "Deliberate by-pass," the waiver standard enunciated
in Fay, was defined narrowly as "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."' 0
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Davis v. United States" began to
cast doubt on the continuing vitality of the Fay waiver standard. Davis
involved a federal prisoner who sought to vacate his sentence pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by asserting a claim he had not previously raised,
namely, that blacks had been excluded from the grand jury that had
indicted him. The Davis Court opted not to apply Fay to determine
2
whether the prisoner had waived his right to collateral review.'
5. Id. at 487.
6. Id. at 485-86.
7. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
8. Id. at 399.
9. Id. at 438.
10. Id. at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The Court in Fay
held that insofar as the state prisoner there involved had been confronted with the "grisly
choice" of accepting a life sentence or taking an appeal which carried the risk of a death
sentence, he had not "deliberately by-passed" state procedures by failing to take a direct
appeal. Id. at 439-40.
11. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
12. The Court distinguished Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), in which
the "deliberate by-pass" standard was applied to a federal prisoner who raised a fourth
amendment claim at trial but not on appeal, on the ground that the Kaufman Court had no
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Rather, the Court held that Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which bars litigation of claims not raised before trial based
on defects in the institution of criminal proceedings, absent "cause
shown" for failing to assert those claims, applied on collateral review as
well as on direct appeal. To hold otherwise, the Court concluded,
would be to "perversely negate" the legitimate federal interests underlying Rule 12, which the Court identified as, first, having such claims
resolved before trial when a defect can easily be cured by obtaining a
new indictment, and, second, discouraging lawyers from delaying the
3
litigation of constitutional claims for tactical reasons.'
Three years later, the Court in Francisv. Henderson'4 applied the
Davis rule in the case of a state prisoner had not complied with a state
procedural rule requiring that claims of grand jury discrimination be
raised before trial. "If, as Davis held, the federal courts must give effect
to [the] important and legitimate concerns [underlying Rule 121 in
§ 2255 proceedings," the Court reasoned, "surely considerations of
comity and federalism require that they give no less effect to the same
clear interests when asked to overturn state criminal convictions."' 5
Accordingly, although without explaining why the waiver standard in
Fay was not controlling, the Court in Francis held that the state prisoner was foreclosed from federal habeas review, for he had failed to
present "not only a showing of 'cause' for [his] failure to challenge the
composition of the grand jury before trial, but also a showing of actual
16
prejudice."'
This two-part waiver standard, under which a petitioner must
show both cause and actual prejudice to overcome a procedural deoccasion to consider the effect of a failure to raise a fourth amentment claim at trial. 411
U.S. at 240 n. 7; see notes 41-48 & accompanying text infra.
13. 411 U.S. at 241.

14. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). On the same day Franciswas decided, the Court in Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976), held that although a state cannot compel an accused
to stand trial before a jury while garbed in prison clothing, the failure of an accused to object
to his being so tried, for whatever reason, was "sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation." In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, characterized the failure of defense counsel to object at trial as
an "inexcusable procedural default" that deprived the defendant of an otherwise valid constitutional claim. Relief from such a default, in Justice Powell's view, ought "not be carried
to the length of allowing counsel for a defendant deliberately to forego objection to a curable trial defect, even though he is aware of the factual and legal basis for an objection,
simply because he thought objection would be futile." Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
See text accompanying notes 141-44 infra.
15. 425 U.S. at 541.
16. Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).

July 1979]

WAINWRIGHT V. SYKES

fault, was derived from Shotwell ManufacturingCo. v. UnitedStates,17
the leading case interpreting the "cause shown" exception to Rule 12.
The petitioners in Shotwell raised an untimely challenge to the selection of their grand and petit juries on the basis of what they termed
"newly discovered" evidence. The Supreme Court, denying relief,
found no "cause shown" under Rule 12 because the "facts concerning
the selection of the grand and petit juries were notorious and available
to petitioners in the exercise of due diligence before the trial,"',, and
because the alleged jury irregularities did not prejudice the petitioners.
"[I]t is entirely proper," the Shotwell Court indicated, "to take absence
of prejudice into account in determining whether a sufficient showing
has been made to warrant relief from [Rule 12]."'19 This admonition
that the absence of prejudice may alter the showing necessary to establish "cause shown" under Rule 12 emerged later in Davis and Francis
as the two-part cause-and-prejudice test governing the waiver of grand
jury claims in the collateral review of both state and federal
convictions.
Wainwright v. Sykes
During its next Term, the Court in Wainwright v. Sykes 2° extended
its decision in Francis beyond grand jury claims. Sykes involved a
state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief on the ground that he had
not validly waived his Miranda rights with regard to several inculpatory statements introduced at trial. His trial counsel, however, had not
raised the Miranda claim at or before trial as mandated by a state contemporaneous-objection rule. The district court granted habeas relief.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focused on
whether the state prisoner had forfeited his right to federal habeas review by failing to comply with the contemporaneous-objection rule.
Reasoning that prejudice was inherent in a case involving the admissibility of an incriminating statement, the appellate court distinguished
Davis v. United States as a case involving a nonprejudicial claim and
turned instead to Fay v. Noia for the applicable waiver standard. The
Davis court concluded that the prisoner's failure to object was not a
trial tactic and thus not a deliberate by-pass.2 '
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the prisoner's failure to
17. 371 U.S. 341 (1963).
18. Id. at 362-63.
19. Id. at 363.
20. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
21. 528 F.2d 522, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1976).
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comply with the state contemporaneous-objection rule in raising his
Mirandaclaim was governed not by the deliberate by-pass waiver standard in Fay, but rather by the Davis and Francis cause-and-actualprejudice standard. This holding reflected the Court's fear that Fay's
"deliberate by-pass" test might "encourage 'sandbagging' on the part of
defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty
in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims
' 22
in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off."
Moreover, the Court expressed the view that the state contemporaneous-objection rule at issue in Sykes "deserves greater respect than Fay
gives it, both for the fact that it is employed by a coordinate jurisdiction
within the federal system and for the many interests which it serves in
its own right. '2 3 Those interests were identified as enhancing the finality of criminal judgments by forcing the litigation of constitutional issues at the trial court level, and promoting judicial efficiency by
enabling the trial court in a single and timely proceeding to develop the
factual record underlying a constitutional claim. Accordingly, the
Court, although not overruling the Fay holding that an adequate and
independent state procedural ground does not deprive a federal court
of the power to entertain a habeas petition, rejected as dictum the suggestion in Fay that the deliberate by-pass test was an "all-inclusive"
waiver standard applicable whenever a state prisoner had committed a
24
procedural default.
The Court in Sykes left "open for resolution in future decisions
the precise definition of the 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard. ' 25 Apart
from its observation that the standard was narrower than the deliberate
by-pass test, the Court noted only that:
Whatever precise content may be given those terms by later cases, we
feel confident in holding without further elaboration that they do not
exist here. Respondent has advanced no explanation whatever for
his failure to object at trial, and, as the proceeding unfolded, the trial
judge is certainly not to be faulted for failing to question the admission of the confession himself. The other evidence of guilt presented
at trial, moreover, was substantial to a degree that would negate any
possibility of actual prejudice resulting2 6to the respondent from the
admission of his inculpatory statement.
This test, it added, would "not prevent a federal habeas court from
22.

433 U.S. at 89.

23. Id. at 88.
24. The precise extent to which Sykes restricted the applicability of the Fay waiver
standard is somewhat uncertain. See notes 28-35 & accompanying text infra.
25. 433 U.S. at 87.
26. Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).
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adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim
of a miscarriage of justice. ' '27 The Court concluded that the state prisoner, having demonstrated neither cause nor actual prejudice, had forfeited his right to federal collateral review.
The Unresolved Issues

Four major issues remain unresolved in the aftermath of Sykes.
First, the Court left uncertain the extent to which the cause-andprejudice test had displaced the deliberate by-pass test. The Court,
without explicitly overruling Fay, rejected as "going far beyond the
facts of [that] case," the "sweeping language" of Fay suggesting that the
deliberate by-pass test applied to all habeas cases involving a procedural default. 28 The Sykes Court, impliedly criticizing the Fay Court for
having strayed far from the facts before it,29 concluded that "[w]e do
not chose to paint with a similarly broad brush here."30o It is clear,
therefore, that the waiver standard in Fay has been substantially overis at present restricted only to
ruled, but whether its continued vitality
3
the facts in Fay remains uncertain. '
The lower federal courts, in response to this uncertainty, have
looked to Sykes for guidance in determining whether to apply the deliberate by-pass test or the cause-and-prejudice test in specific factual
contexts. Such guidance has been found not in the majority opinion in
Sykes but rather in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Burger argued that "the 'deliberate bypass' standard

. . .

was

never designed for, and is inapplicable to, errors--even of constitutional dimension-alleged to have been committed during trial."'32 Requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant was
appropriate, he conceded, in the context of procedural decisions entrusted to the defendant himself, such as the decision to take an appeal
or to request the representation of counsel. Requiring such a waiver,
however, was particularly inappropriate in the context of trial decisions
normally committed to counsel, for "[tjhe trial process simply does not
permit the type of frequent and protracted interruptions which would
27. Id.
28. Id. at 87-88.
29. The court even reserved for future resolution the question whether Fay still governed the facts of that case, namely, when a criminal defendant has waived all state rights to
direct review of constitutional claims by failing to appeal a conviction. Id. at 88 n.12.
30. Id.
31. See, Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977).
32. 433 U.S. at 91-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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be necessary if it were required that clients give knowing and intelligent approval to each of the myriad tactical decisions as a trial proceeds." 33 This distinction, also endorsed by Justice Stevens in his

concurring opinion in Sykes, 34 has prevailed in the lower federal
courts. The majority view to date is that Fay governs decisions "of the
sort entrusted to the defendant himself," whereas Sykes governs deci'35
sions "of the kind normally committed to counsel.
A second issue confronting the lower federal courts is whether the
Court in Sykes intended that a federal habeas court, as a condition
precedent to applying the cause-and-prejudice test, must find that the
failure of a habeas petitioner to raise his claim in accordance with state
procedures is an adequate and independent state ground that would
preclude direct review in the Supreme Court. 36 This issue arises because of the way in which the Sykes opinion is structured. After dividing the law of federal habeas corpus into four areas, the Sykes court
33. Id. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
34. Id. at 94-95 & 95 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); accord, Rinehart v.
Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977). Courts have applied this distinction between
decisions committed to counsel and those reserved for the defendant in cases involving not
only the waiver of claims at ti ial, but also the waiver of claims on appeal. The prevailing
rule is that Fay governs the decision whether to appeal at all, whereas Sykes governs the
decision whether to appeal a particular claim. See, e.g., Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284, 286
(3d Cir. 1978); Evans v. Maggio, 557 F.2d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1977); Ennis v. LeFevre, 560
F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J.) (nonplurality opinion); United States ex rel.
Carbone v. Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611, 619 & n.4 (D. Conn. 1978); Ramsey v. United States,
448 F. Supp. 1264, 1273-74 & 1273 n.18 (N.D. Il. 1978). But see Buckelew v. United States,
575 F.2d 515, 518-19 & 519 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978); Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1077 (2d
Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring).
By way of example, the court in Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 737 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), listed as decisions of the sort normally entrusted to the defendant himself
the decision whether to plead guilty, whether to forego assistance of counsel, and whether to
refrain from taking an appeal. Such decisions were, in the court's view, still governed by the
deliberate by-pass test.
36. If the adequate and independent state ground doctrine does not form an independent inquiry, then it may be subsumed as part of the "cause" test. In other words, a habeas
petitioner could show cause for failure to abide by a state rule if the rule itself would not
preclude direct review of the constitutional claims in the Supreme Court. Use of the doctrine as a definition of cause would, however, mandate that a prisoner show actual prejudice
in addition to the presence of an inadequate state ground. Such a result would be more
restrictive than either the application of the doctrine on direct review or the application of
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), which allows a federal court to hear the merits of a
fourth amendment claim if the habeas petitioner did not have a "full and fair opportunity"
to present his claim in state court. See text accompanying notes 54-60 infra. The "full and
fair opportunity" test has not been read to incorporate any form of actual prejudice. See,
e.g., Note, Circuits Split over Application ofStone v. Powell's "Opportunity/orFull and Fair
Litigation," 39 VAND. L. REV. 881 (1977).
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identified the relevant inquiry in the case before it to be determining:
"[i]n what instances . . . an adequate and independent state ground
[will] bar consideration of otherwise cognizable federal issues on fed-

eral habeas review.' 37 Upon concluding that the state contemporaneous-objection rule there at issue was adequate and independent, the
Court then held that the cause-and-prejudice test should be applied to
determine whether, as a matter of federal law, the habeas petitioner
had waived his right to federal habeas review.' 8 The Sykes Court may

thus have indicated that the adequacy and independence of a state
9
ground must form a preliminary inquiry in each Sykes case.'
Requiring such an inquiry would have two practical consequences.
First, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, a body of
law that long has been within the Supreme Court's exclusive domain,
would be applied routinely by the lower federal courts in each procedural default case. Second, and more importantly, a federal habeas court,

by finding that a state ground is not adequate or independent, could
avoid the cause-and-prejudice inquiry altogether and proceed directly

to the merits of a habeas petitioner's claim. Already some lower federal courts have avoided application of the Sykes test by explicitly invoking, or relying on lines of analysis appropriate to, the adequate and
40
independent state ground doctrine.

37. 433 U.S. at 78-79.
38. Id. at 86-87. Sykes did not overrule Fays holding that an adequate and independent state ground does not bar federal habeas review; instead the Court simply revised the
federal waiver standard. Id. at 87-88, 100-01 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. There can be no dispute that even if Sykes does not mandate an inquiry into the
adequacy and independence of a state ground, a federal habeas court, before applying the
cause-and-prejudice test, must determine whether the habeas petitioner in fact violated a
state procedural rule in raising his claim. The waiver standard in Sykes is not applicable
where the habeas petitioner was not required under state procedures to raise his federal
constitutional claim in a particular manner or at a particular time during the state court
proceeding, see, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(defendant not required under Texas law to challenge at trial the constitutionality of the
statute under which he is convicted); where the petitioner has not violated a state procedural
rule because his case falls within an exception to that rule, see, e.g., Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant, contrary to general rule, not required
under North Carolina law to object at trial to prosecutor's closing statement where "argument of counsel in a capital case is so grossly improper that removal of its prejudicial effect,
after a curative instruction, remains in doubt"); Cole v. Stevenson, 447 F. Supp. 1268, 1272
(E.D.N.C. 1978) (defendant, contrary to general rule, not required to object at trial to jury
instructions containing presumptively prejudicial errors of law); or where the habeas petitioner has in fact complied with the state procedure in question, see Thomas v. Estelle, 582
F.2d 939, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1978); Henne v. Fike, 563 F.2d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
40. A line of adequate and independent state ground cases that refuses to countenance
the application of a state rule in a manner violative of due process has been invoked by some
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The lower federal courts have focused on yet a third question:
whether the cause-and-prejudice test governs cases involving federal
prisoners seeking to vacate their convictions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
federal courts confronted with a Sykes situation. Compare White v. Estelle, 566 F.2d 500,
504 (5th Cir. 1978) (state trial court's denial of a motion for continuance not made in conformance with a state procedural rule amounted to "manifest injustice") and United States
v. McCloud, No. 78-C-1424 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1978) (it "would shock the conscience" to bar
a youthful offender from seeking habeas corpus relief from unconstitutional sentencing because he did not comply with a state rule that the challenge be raised at trial) with Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955) (federal claim should have been considered by state
supreme court on the merits where defendant was not given a constitutionally adequate
opportunity to raise the claim). Other adequate state ground cases, which support the proposition that a state court's decision not to exercise its discretion to hear a federal claim will
not constitute an adequate state ground, have been similarly invoked. Compare Taylor v.
Reid, No. 78 Civ. 862 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1978) (Because under state law "a failure to object
does not necessarily foreclose an attack based upon an alleged constitutional infirmity...
petitioner's claim is not foreclosed by failure to object at trial.") with Williams v. Georgia,
349 U.S. 375, 389 (1955) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider federal claim where
state supreme court declines to grant motion for a new trial "though possessed of power to
do so under state law."); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1969)
(Supreme Court reaches a federal claim where a state court, exercising its discretion, refused
to hear the claim despite the arguable violation of a state procedural rule); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449 n.5 (1965), and id. at 454-57 (Black, J., dissenting).
The adequate state ground case of Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965),
which suggests that application of a state procedural rule might be inadequate "unless the
State's insistence on compliance. . . serves a legitimate state interest," offers another avenue
for federal courts to avoid application of the Sykes test. See St. John v. Estelle, 563 F.2d
168, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (motion for mistrial made eight questions after damaging testimony adequately served state's interest in
demanding contemporaneous objection to witness' testimony); Holmes v. Israel, 453 F.
Supp. 864, 867 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (Sykes may be inapplicable where counsel failed to make
specific objection to evidence as required by state rule but did make general objection and
moved for mistrial). The continued viability of Henry has been questioned, however. See
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FED-

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 558-62 (2d ed. 1973); Hill, The Forfeitureof ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Cases,78 COLUM. L. REV. 1050, 1052 (1978). See also Monger
v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958 (1972) (Supreme Court upholds as adequate a state court's dismissal
of an appeal because, contrary to state procedure, it had been filed after oral judgment but
before the written judgment was handed down). Nevertheless, the Sykes Court cited Henry
in support of its conclusion that the Florida contemporaneous-objection rule constituted an
adequate and independent state ground. 433 U.S. at 87.
In addition to the formulations of the adequate state ground rule noted above, the
Supreme Court has held state grounds to be inadequate where the state ground could not
have been foreseen, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958), if its application
amounted to an "arid ritual of meaningless form," Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320
(1958), or if the application of the state rule appeared to have been arbitrary or designed to
frustrate federal constitutional rights, Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 230-31 (1904). See
also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra, at 526-62; L. TRIBE,
ERAL

120-29 (1978); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, B. COOPER & E.
GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS
§§ 4025-28 (1977); Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1965).
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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§ 2255, on grounds not raised in accordance with applicable federal
procedures. In Davis v. United States,4' the Court confronted the case
of a federal prisoner seeking section 2255 relief on a claim of grand
jury discrimination not raised before trial as required by Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court, in order not to undermine the important federal interests underlying Rule 12, held that
the "cause shown" exception to Rule 12 applied with equal force on

direct and collateral review. The rationale of Davis, therefore, strongly
suggests that in section 2255 proceedings the cause-and-prejudice test
applies not only to grand jury claims, but rather to all claims governed

by Rule 12.42 A more difficult question is whether, in light of the strong
language in Sykes emphasizing the important interests underlying procedural rules requiring timely objections to asserted errors, 43 Sykes
mandates that the cause-and-prejudice test apply not just to claims governed by Rule 12, but rather to all claims not raised in accordance with
applicable federal procedures. To date, the lower federal courts have

read Sykes expansively, applying the cause-and-prejudice test in sec44
tion 2255 proceedings involving a variety of non-Rule 12 claims.
Thus, the lower federal courts have faced three major issues relating to

the applicability of the Sykes cause-and-actual-prejudice standard for
collateral review.
The resolution of the three preceeding issues would, however, be

far from a complete settlement of the unresolved questions after Sykes.
The fourth issue confronting the lower federal courts, and the issue to

which this Article is addressed, is the meaning of the terms "cause" and
"actual prejudice," the two prongs of the Sykes waiver standard. The
Article turns first to the definition of "actual prejudice," for, as ex41. 411 U.S. 233 (1977). For a discussion of Davis, see text accompanying notes 11-13
supra.
42. See United States v. Underwood, 440 F. Supp. 499, 501-02 (D.R.I. 1977) (Davis
rule applied in a § 2255 proceeding to a fourth amendment claim that the federal prisoner
had not raised before trial as required by Rule 12).
43. 433 U.S. at 88-90.
44. See Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure to raise
on direct appeal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e), the claim that the
trial transcript was incomplete because of the alleged suppression of judicial misconduct);
Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure to raise at trial or on direct
appeal claim that petitioner had been denied right to a unanimous verdict); Brawer v.
United States, 462 F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (failure to object at trial to impeachment on
the basis of prior uncounseled convictions); cf Fanow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 135657 (9th Cir. 1978) (assuming, without deciding, that Sykes governs the waiver of a claim, not
raised either at time of sentence as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(1)
or on direct appeal, that petitioner's sentence was improperly enhanced on the basis of prior
uncounseled convictions).
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plained below, the factors relevant to defining "actual prejudice" may
also have a bearing on the definition of "cause."
Actual Prejudice
One prong of the Sykes waiver standard requires a habeas petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural default to make some showing
of actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional violation he has
alleged. 45 This section examines three sources of authority suggesting
possible definitions of actual prejudice and then explores the Supreme
Court and lower court interpretations of the term.
Sources of Authority to Define "Actual Prejudice"
One source of authority to define actual prejudice is the view, advocated by Justice Black and Judge Friendly, that the availability of
collateral review under habeas corpus and section 2255 should depend
on a petitioner's ability to make a colorable showing that he did not in
fact commit the crime for which he was convicted. The assumption
underlying this view was first voiced by Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion in Kaufman v. United States.46 In Kaufman where the Court
permitted a federal prisoner to obtain collateral relief under section
2255 for a search and seizure claim he had not raised on direct review,47 Justice Black argued that not every conviction involving a constitutional error should be subject to collateral review. He singled out
the petitioner's "probable or possible innocence" as an important factor
that should govern the availability of collateral relief, noting that "few
would think that justice requires release of a person whose allegations
clearly show that he was guilty of the crime of which he had been
48
convicted."
Following Justice Black's dissent in Kaufman, Judge Friendly, in
an influential article, 49 advanced the thesis "that, with a few important
exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when
the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim
of innocence. '50 Arguing that collateral review runs counter to impor45.
46.

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 91 (1977).
394 U.S. 217, 232-42 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).

47. Finding no "deliberate by-pass" of the direct appeal, the Court held that, under the
then applicable Fay standard, the prisoner had not waived his right to collateral review. Id.
at 220 n.3.
48.
49.
CHi.

L.

50.

Id. at 233.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
REV.

142 (1970).

Id. at 142.
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tant values underlying the criminal system, Judge Friendly took issue
with the maxim that "'[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation
have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.' "51 He agreed "that 'conventional notions
of finality' should not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation," but disagreed "that they should have none."'52 Balancing the
state interest in the finality of criminal judgments against the defendant's interest in vindicating his innocence, Judge Friendly argued that
although any defendant should have the opportunity on direct review
to litigate constitutional claims, only a defendant with "a colorable
claim of innocence" should have that opportunity on collateral review.
In clarifying what he meant by "a colorable claim of innocence,"
Judge Friendly emphasized that he did not mean a showing that the
petitioner, but for the alleged constitutional error, might not or would
not have been convicted. Instead, he defined his threshhold criterion as
requiring a petitioner for collateral relief to show "a fair probability
that, in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been
illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and
evidence tenably claimed to have become wrongly excluded or to have
become available only after the trial, the trier of facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt."' 53 This would mean that,
under the Sykes standard, a petitioner suffers "actual prejudice" from a
constitutional claim only when he can make a colorable showing of
factual innocence.
Such an interpretation of actual prejudice embodies the assumption, endorsed by both Justice Black and Judge Friendly, that the
proper role of collateral review is not to remedy every unconstitutional
conviction, but rather to remedy every unconstitutional conviction of
an innocent person. A guilty prisoner, so the argument goes, suffers no
actual prejudice from the procedural foreclosure of his constitutional
claims. The crucial inquiry under this interpretation of actual
prejudice is, once again, whether the petitioner can demonstrate, based
on all available evidence (legal and illegal, admitted and not admitted)
the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
A second source of authority for defining "actual prejudice" is the
view apparently underlying Justice Powell's majority opinion in Stone
v.Powel 54-- that the primary purpose of habeas corpus is to ensure
51. Id. at 149 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963)).
52. Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 160.
54. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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that a petitioner has been accorded those constitutional guarantees
bearing on the reliability of the guilt-determining process. In Stone,
the Court held that where a state petitioner has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claims on direct review,
the petitioner may not invoke habeas corpus to litigate those claims in
federal court.
A concise statement of the Stone Court's view of the appropriate
role of habeas corpus appears in a footnote of the majority opinion,
where, after listing those societal values undermined by habeas corpus,
it concluded:
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing the
need in a free society for an additional safeguard against compelling
an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty ...
But in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment claim, asserted on
collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to
issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his
redetermine an
55
incarceration.
In the first quoted sentence, the Court seems to suggest that the role of
habeas corpus is to remedy all constitutional errors in cases where the
petitioner was convicted of a crime that he did not in fact commit. This
would create a system of habeas review akin to the Black-Friendly approach. The second sentence as well as the actual holding in Stone,
however, focus not upon the guilt or innocence of the petitioner, but
rather upon the type of claim asserted. 56 The thrust of Stone is to provide collateral relief only for the violation of those constitutional rights
"bearing on the basic justice of [a convicted defendant's]
incarceration."
A constitutional right "bearing on the basic justice of [a convicted
defendant's] incarceration" is one that increases the accuracy of the
trier of fact's determination that an individual committed the crime for
which he was convicted (hereafter referred to as a "truth-furthering"
right). 57 The classic example of a truth-furthering right is the sixth
55. Id. at 491 n.31.
56. In assessing the availability of habeas corpus in cases where the habeas petitioner
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims on direct review, Justice Powell
consistently has focused upon the nature of the petitioner's claim rather than upon the petitioner's actual guilt or innocence. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) (Powell,
J., concurring) (Massiah violation); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n. 1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (grand jury discrimination); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976)
(search and seizure claim); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (search and seizure claim).
57. See Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035, 1092 (1977) ("Truth-furthering rights are rights that foster sound
guilt/innocence determinations with the requisite degree of certainty.")
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amendment right-to effective assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant, in the Supreme Court's view, "requires the guiding hand of coun-

sel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. ' ' 58 Effective assistance of counsel
thus reduces the likelihood of an erroneous conviction. In contrast,
fourth amendment claims are non-truth-furthering because illegally

seized evidence is "typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 59 Ex-

clusion of such evidence, therefore, often bears a negative correlation to
the reliability of the truth-determining process.
Applying Stone to all non-truth-furthering rights would yield a
system of collateral review designed primarily to ensure that every
habeas petitioner has been accorded those constitutional rights bearing

on the reliability of the guilt-determining process. 60 Those claims cognizable under Stone guarantee, in effect, a minimum degree of factfinding accuracy in the criminal process. The model of habeas corpus

contemplated by Stone suggests an interpretation of the "actual
prejudice" standard focusing on whether the claim that the habeas petitioner failed to raise properly involves a truth-furthering right. If so,
the petitioner would satisfy the actual prejudice test; if not, the petitioner would have lost his right to collateral review.
A third source of authority for defining actual prejudice is the
harmless-error rule, 6 ' which measures the prejudicial effect of a trial
court error. The doctrine of harmless error, which assumes that some

trial errors simply are too insignificant to warrant reversal of the trier of
fact's judgment, is invoked by appellate courts to determine whether a

litigant asserting an error is entitled to a new trial.
58. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
59. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
60. The Supreme Court has not yet applied Stone v. Powell to claims other than the
fourth amendment, although it is currently considering a case which offers the opportunity
to extend Stone to the claim that the foreman of a grand jury was chosen in a racially
discriminatory manner. See Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1977), cert granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978). Justice Powell has raised the issue of Stone's applicability to the claim of an unconstitutionally constituted grand jury, see Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 508 n.l (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting), as well as to fifth and sixth amendment
claims, see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
61. See generally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Field, Assessing the Harmlessnessof FederalConstitutionalError-A Processin Need ofa Rationale,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Field]; Saltzburg, The Harm ofHarmless
Error,59 VA. L. REv. 988 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Saltzburg].
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The Supreme Court, prior to its decision in Chapman v.
California,62 seemed to follow a per se rule requiring the automatic
reversal of a defendant's conviction in criminal cases involving constitutional errors. 63 Though retaining the per se rule for a limited number
of trial errors, 64 the Court in Chapman adopted a more flexible standard: "[Blefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. ' 65 Put another way, the Chapman standard mandates a reversal where it is "reasonably possible" that the trial court's
error influenced the verdict of the trier of fact 66 The Chapman Court
further held that the beneficiary of a constitutional error, rather than
67
the defendant, has the burden of proof in a harmless error case.
In applying the Chapman standard in subsequent cases, the Court
has taken two approaches to evaluating a harmless error.68 Under the
first approach, the Court asks whether, upon excluding the evidence
tainted by constitutional error, the jury's verdict is still supported by
"overwhelming evidence." This approach is illustrated by Milton v.
Wainwright,69 where the Court invoked the harmless-error rule to dismiss a habeas petition challenging on constitutional grounds the introduction at trial of a postindictment confession that was obtained by a
police officer posing as an accused person confined with the petitioner.
In denying relief without reaching the merits, the Court noted that
62. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
63. See Saltzburg, supra note 61, at 999-1002.

64. In his majority opinion in Chapman, Justice Black noted that "our prior cases have
indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction
can never be treated as harmless error." 386 U.S. at 23. To support this proposition, he

cited three examples: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)

(impartial judge). 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
65.

386 U.S. at 24. The Chapman harmless error standard conforms with the due proc-

ess requirement, enunciated in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that the state prove
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of a criminal offense. That is, insofar as the trier of

fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of a criminal charge, an
appellate court, in finding harmless error, should be no less certain that a trial court error
did not affect the verdict. The appellate court, under a less stringent harmless error standard, would be able to uphold a conviction that, given the error of the trial court, no longer
satisfied the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Chapman ensures that In re
Winship is not undermined on appellate review. See Saltzburg, supra note 61, at 1014-15

n.89.
66. Saltzburg, supra note 61, at 1014 & n.88.
67. 386 U.S. at 24.
68. See Field, supra note 61, at 16-36; Saltzburg, supra note 61, at 1014-15 n.89. One
commentator has suggested that the Court may be developing a third approach to harmless

error. See note 74 infra.
69.

407 U.S. 371 (1972).
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"[t]he jury, in addition to hearing the challenged testimony, was
presented with overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt, including
no less than three full confessions" that were constitutionally admissable. 70 Thus, the Court focused not upon the prejudicial effect of
the tainted evidence, but rather upon the sufficiency of the untainted
evidence.
Under the second approach to harmless error, the Court inquires
whether there is a "reasonable possibility" that the tainted evidence
influenced the verdict of the jury. In Chapman, the Court held that a
prosecutor's comment upon the defendants' failure to testify in their
own behalf and a trial judge's instruction to the jury that it could draw
71
adverse inferences from such failure did not constitute harmless error.
The Court reached its conclusion by resolving "whether there [was] a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction, '72 rather than focusing, as the lower court
had done, on whether the jury was presented with overwhelming evi73
dence of the defendants' guilt.
The obvious contrast between the two approaches to harmless error is that the former, as illustrated by Milton, focuses on the sufficiency of the untainted evidence, whereas the latter, as illustrated by
Chapman, focuses on the possible prejudicial effect of the tainted evi75
dence. 74 As one commentator persuasively has argued, however,
these two approaches will yield similar results under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in Chapman.7 6 If the Chapman standard is
met under the first approach (te., the untainted evidence of guilt is
overwhelming beyond a reasonable doubt), "it is hard to believe," so
70. Id. at 372.
71. 386 U.S. at 26.
72. Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
73. Id. at 23-24. The Court, however, did not focus entirely upon the tainted evidence.
See, e.g., id. at 25-26 ("[Tlhough the case in which this occurred presented a reasonably
strong 'circumstantial web of evidence' against petitioners,. . . it was also a case in which,
absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well
have brought in not-guilty verdicts.") (citation omitted).
74. The cases do not reveal whether the Court clearly prefers one approach over the
other. In addition to the conflict between Chapman and Milton, the Court in Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969), apparently applied the "overwhelming evidence" test
while claiming to reaffirm Chapman. This peculiar result has lead one commentator to conclude that Harrington may herald a third approach to harmless error "that focuses on
whether the tainted evidence was 'merely cumulative'--that is, whether untainted evidence
that says the same thing as the excluded evidence remains in the case." Field, supranote 61,
at 37.
75. Saltzburg, spra note 61, at 1014-15 n.89.
76. See note 65 supra.
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the commentator observed, "that the. . . test [for the second approach]
would not also be met, i e., that anyone could believe that the error
contributed to the verdict, or that its contribution was significant
77
enough to warrant reversal.1
For the purposes of this Article, however, it is less important to
distinguish between the approaches to harmless error than it is to distinguish between harmless error and the other sources of authority that
may be used to define "actual prejudice." Both approaches to the
harmless error standard differ markedly from the "colorable showing
of innocence" standard for actual prejudice. The "overwhelming evidence" approach varies from the "colorable showing of innocence" requirement in that the former examines only the sufficiency of untainted
evidence introduced at trial, whereas the latter examines the sufficiency
of all evidence-tainted or untainted, admitted or not admitted. That
is, the former focuses on legal guilt based on the admissible portion of
the trial record, while the latter focuses on factual guilt based on all the
available evidence. The "reasonable possibility" approach differs from
the "colorable showing of innocence" requirement because the former
examines only the effect of tainted evidence, whereas the latter examines all available evidence. The "reasonable possibility" approach focuses exclusively on the effect of the constitutional error on the
determination of legal guilt, while the "colorable showing of innocence" requirement examines factual guilt.
These distinctions are best illustrated in the context of a meritorious fourth amendment or Miranda claim that evidence admitted at
trial should have been suppressed. Such claims often involve evidence
that is both reliable and highly probative of guilt. Accordingly, a
habeas court applying harmless-error analysis is apt to conclude either
that it is reasonably possible that the tainted evidence contributed to
the verdict or that exclusion of the tainted evidence leaves less than
overwhelming evidence to support the verdict. Under the "colorable
showing of innocence" test, a habeas court, now focusing on the entire
record, is apt to conclude that the petitioner's factual guilt remains beyond dispute.
Harmless error also differs from the "truth-furthering right" requirement of Stone v. Powell.7 8 Both the "overwhelming evidence" and
the "reasonable possibility" approaches measure the effect of a specific
constitutional error in a particular factual setting. The classification of
77.
78.

Saltzburg, supra note 61, at 1014-15 n.89.
See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra.
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rights as "truth-furthering," however, distinguishes claims on the basis
of the probable impact of the constitutional error on the accuracy of the
guilt-determining process. Thus, a fourth amendment claim, which is a
classic non-truth-furthering right, and hence insufficient to support a
petition for collateral review under this test, may be prejudicial under
harmless-error analysis if, for example, there is a reasonable possibility
that introduction of illegally seized evidence may have influenced the
jury's verdict.
In sum, the case law and commentary on habeas corpus suggest
three possible interpretations of the actual prejudice standard. First,
actual prejudice may refer to the possible factual innocence of the
habeas petitioner-that is, whether the petitioner, based on all the
available evidence, can make a colorable claim that he did not, in fact,
commit the crime for which he was convicted. Second, the term may
refer to whether the constitutional right allegedly violated bears a positive correlation to the reliability of the guilt-determining process.
Third, actual prejudice may refer to whether the procedural foreclosure
of the petitioner's claim is harmless error.
Judicial Interpretations of "Actual Prejudice"

Although reserving for future cases the precise definition of "actual prejudice," 79 the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes applied
the term to the facts before it in a manner similar to, yet a variant of,
the harmless-error doctrine. The similarity emerges in the passage
where the Court, concluding that the state prisoner had not demonstrated prejudice arising from his Miranda claim, noted that "[t]he
other evidence of guilt presented at trial.

. .

was substantial to a de-

gree that would negate any possibility of actual prejudice resulting to
the [prisoner] from the admission of his inculpatory statement." 80 The
variation lies in the fact that the Court required the petitioner to bear
the burden of demonstrating the harm of the constitutional error,81
79. 433 U.S. at 87.
80. Id. at 91. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
81. 433 U.S. at 84. This point did not escape the attention of Justice White who commented in his concurring Sykes opinion that he felt that the harmless error rule itself adequately protected the state's interests: "As long as there is acceptable cause for the
defendant's not objecting to the evidence, there should not be shifted to him the burden of
proving specific prejudice to the satisfaction of the habeas corpus judge." Id. at 98 (White,
J., concurring).
Shifting the burden to the petitioner has resulted in the dismissal of many habeas petitions for want of any showing of actual prejudice. See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578
F.2d 582, 620 (5th Cir. 1978); Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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rather than the government. 82 Thus, the Court in Sykes apparently
concluded that, absent a showing that it was reasonably possible that
the asserted error influenced the verdict of the trier of fact, the state
prisoner had not made the requisite demonstration of actual prejudice
83
to overcome his procedural default.
The vast majority of lower court decisions applying the actual
84
prejudice standard have followed the approach suggested in Sykes.
The "overwhelming evidence" approach to analyzing harmless error
appears, for example, in Thomas v. Estelle,8 5 where a panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that a habeas petitioner had not demonstrated actual prejudice. The petitioner in
Thomas was a state prisoner who upon his conviction for felony theft
was given an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to a
state habitual offender statute. During the guilt phase of petitioner's
bifurcated trial on the theft charge, the prosecutor read to the jury the
indictment against petitioner which referred not only to the theft
charge, but also to the habitual offender statute and to two earlier felony convictions. Petitioner's counsel failed to comply with a state contemporaneous-objection rule by neither objecting when the prosecutor
read the indictment to the jury nor requesting an instruction limiting
the jury's consideration of the prior conviction evidence to its determination at the punishment phase of the trial. On federal habeas review,
petitioner successfully asserted in the district court that he had been
denied a fair trial and was granted relief.
The Fifth Circuit in Thomas reversed the district court, holding
82. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
83. Two members of the Court in Sykes observed that the majority had read a harmless-error standard into the definition of actual prejudice. Though suggesting in passing that
Stone v. Powell might inform the meaning of actual prejudice, 433 U.S. at 110, Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that "[tihe 'prejudice' inquiry ... appears to bear
a strong resemblance to harmless-error doctrine." Id. at 117. Reaching the same conclusion, Justice White chose to concur only in the judgment in Sykes, largely on the ground
that the harmless-error rule applies by its own force in habeas cases. He reasoned: "It is thus
of some moment to me that the Court makes its own assessment of the record and itself
declares that the evidence of guilt in this case is sufficient to 'negate any possibility of actual
prejudice resulting to the respondent from the admission of his inculpatory statement'. ...
This appears to be tantamount to a finding of harmless error under the Harringtonstandard
and is itself sufficient to foreclose the writ and to warrant reversal of the judgment." Id. at
97-98. See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 557 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(advocates a harmless error approach to defining "actual prejudice").
84. See, e.g., McDonald v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 433
U.S. 904 (1977), reaffirmed in relevantpart,564 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1977); Ramsey v. United
States, 448 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Bromwell v. Williams, 445 F. Supp. 106,
114, 120 (D. Md. 1977).
85. 587 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1979).
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that petitioner was barred under Sykes from seeking collateral review
in federal court. Finding that petitioner had not made the requisite
showing of actual prejudice, the court of appeals noted:
Actual prejudice, or its absence, must be determined by the facts
and circumstances of each case. See Wainwright v. Sykes .... The
danger inherent in the admission of prior convictions is that juries
may convict a defendant because he is a "bad man" rather than because evidence of the crime of which he is charged has proved him
guilty. . . . No such prejudice ispossible here. The evidence ofpeitioner'sguilt is overwhelming. A store employee saw petitioner take
the money from the cash register. After being pursued from the store
and apprehended by another employee, petitioner was heard to exclaim, "Let me go. You have got the money. Let me go." The stolen
funds and checks were found under the car next to which petitioner
fell when captured. Therefore, we cannot say that the petitioner was
actually prejudiced by this erroneous reading of two prior felony
convictions8 6 to the jury without an accompanying limiting
instruction.
The reasoning and language of the court in Thomas are virtually identical to that appearing in harmless-error cases in which the "over7
whelming evidence" test is applied.
The "reasonable possibility" approach to harmless-error analysis
which, unlike the "overwhelming evidence" test, focuses on the prejudicial effect of the tainted evidence, also has been widely used by the
lower courts in defining actual prejudice. A good example is United
States v. Underwood,88 a section 2255 proceeding involving the procedural default of a fourth amendment claim. In Underwood, the petitioner, who had been convicted of selling two ounces of cocaine,
alleged that the police had made a warrantless search of his apartment
resulting in the unlawful seizure of additional cocaine. At petitioner's
trial for the sale of the two ounces, the only reference to the additional
cocaine came during the testimony of a police officer who mentioned
that he had sent a substance described by the petitioner as cocaine to a
police lab for chemical analysis. That testimony, however, corroborated other admissible evidence contradicting petitioner's entrapment
defense. Furthermore, petitioner's counsel failed to make a timely motion to suppress the officer's testimony.
The district court, denying collateral relief because of the procedural default interpreted the actual prejudice standard as "requir[ing]
the petitioner simply to show that the suppressible evidence could have
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 698-99 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
440 F. Supp. 499 (D.R.I. 1977).
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contributed to the jury verdict, thus incorporating the harmless error
standard of Chapman v. California."89 Applying this standard to the
facts at issue, the court concluded:
[P]rejudice in fact has not been shown: the courtroom procedure and
testimony, at best, played a minor role in the jury verdict. Indeed,
the jury might well have concluded that the allegedly illegally obtained evidence was not cocaine since no evidence to that effect was
introduced.
Because the prejudice is harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Court will not grant relief from petitioner's 'waiver' [of his
fourth amendment claim]. 90
This case, therefore, is similar to Thomas insofar as both apply a variant of harmless error analysis, but different insofar as the former focuses on the prejudicial effect of the tainted evidence whereas the latter
focuses on the sufficiency of the untainted evidence.
Not all courts, however, have applied harmless-error analysis.
The court in Robertson v. Collins9' specifically held that ,the BlackFriendly "colorable showing of innocence" requirement and not a variant of the harmless-error test should govern the definition of actual
prejudice: The court, after analyzing Sykes and Judge Friendly's seminal commentary on the scope of habeas corpus, 92 stated that "[tihe
prejudice standard adopted in Davis, Francis, and now [Sykes] serves
to embody precisely the limited habeas review which Judge Friendly
had in mind . . .to prevent the miscarriage of justice which results
from convicting an innocent person. '93 Reviewing in detail the evidence introduced at the petitioner's murder trial, the court held that the
use of jury instructions inconsistent with Mullaney v. Wilbur9 4 had not
created actual prejudice. The court concluded that, on the basis of the
"weak testimony" presented on behalf of the petitioners and the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified the petitioner as the murderer, the petitioner "failed to raise even a colorable showing of
innocence." 95
The Robertson court not only employed the Black-Friendly test; it
explicitly rejected use of harmless-error analysis as inconsistent with
Sykes for two reasons: (1) the harmless-error test treats some claims as
89.
90.
91.
92.
U. CHi
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 503.
Id. at 503-04.
Civ. No. Y-78-1544 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 1979).
See Friendly, Is InnocenceIrrevelant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38
L. REV. 142 (1970).
Civ. No. Y-78-1544, slip op. at 14 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 1979).
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Civ. No. Y-78-1544, slip op. at 18 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 1979).
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per se harmful whereas the Sykes Court, in rejecting use of an "inherent prejudice" standard, emphasized the petitioner's factual guilt, 96 and
(2) the Chapman test focuses upon the effect of an error on the trial
judgment whereas the "colorable showing of innocence test" "would
permit habeas review in this case if petitioner could present evidence
tending to support his innocence." 97 The habeas petitioner in Robertson would therefore be allowed to present evidence in support of his
petition that was not presented to the trial court. By virtue of this reasoning, the Robertson court thus became the first lower federal court
of harmless-error reasoning in favor of the
specifically to reject use 98
approach.
Black-Friendly
This more rigorous definition of actual prejudice is not inconsistent with Sykes. In Sykes, the Court, without even having to consider
the inculpatory statements challenged on Miranda grounds, was convinced that "[tihe other evidence of guilt presented at trial . . . was
substantial to a degree that would negate any possibility of actual
prejudice resulting to respondent from the admission of his inculpatory
statements." 99 It was unnecessary on the facts in Sykes, absent a proffer of exculpatory evidence not adduced at trial, to decide whether the
inquiry into actual prejudice might include an examination of all available evidence, even that which is assertedly tainted. To include such
evidence in the actual prejudice inquiry would be to make it more difficult for habeas petitioners asserting non-truth-furthering rights (for example, Miranda and fourth amendment claims) to overcome a
procedural default, inasmuch as the assertedly tainted evidence in such
cases is often both reliable and highly probative of guilt. It is impossible to discern on the basis of the Sykes decision alone, however,
whether the Supreme Court will agree with the more restrictive definition of actual prejudice suggested in Rabertson.
Yet another way to narrow the scope of collateral relief in cases
where the petitioner has failed to comply with a state procedural rule in
raising a non-truth-furthering claim would be to define "actual
prejudice" in terms of the distinction in Stone v. Powell between truth96. But see note 106 infra.
97. Civ. No. Y-78-1544, slip op. at 18 n.6 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 1979).
98. In Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 1978), the court analyzed actual
prejudice in terms of both harmless-error analysis and what it termed "a subjective evaluation of guilt by an appellate court based on an overall record." The latter, like the BlackFriendly approach, focused on the petitioner's factual guilt based on all available evidence.
The court, finding an absence of actual prejudice under either approach, had no occasion to
choose between them.
99. 433 U.S. at 91.
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furthering and non-truth-furthering claims.1°° That Stone might potentially inform the meaning of actual prejudice is suggested not only
by Justice Brennan's passing comment to that effect in Sykes,' 0 ' but
also by two lower court decisions, Sincox v. United States,10 2 and Graham v. Maryland.0 3 In each case, the court concluded that on the basis
of the claim asserted the petitioner had demonstrated actual prejudice.
Moreover, each petitioner asserted truth-furthering rights: Sincox involved a claim that petitioner had been convicted by a less than unanimous jury, and Graham involved a claim that the trial court had
unconstitutionally allocated to petitioner the burden of proving an alibi
defense. ° 4 Accordingly, if Stone were to inform the meaning of actual
prejudice, the petitioners in these two cases would be able to demonstrate actual prejudice attendant to the foreclosure of their claims. 10 5
Sincox and Graham may also be read as cases where courts, in
defining actual prejudice in terms of harmless error, have concluded
that the claims there presented were per se harmful. 0 6 This analysis is
07
consistent with Chapman v. California,1
where the Court noted that
some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction
is intrinsically harmful. 0 8 Both Sincox and Graham involved constitutional claims fundamental to the right to a fair trial. In Sincox, the
court noted:
100.

See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra.

101. 433 U.S. at 110 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 83 supra.
102. 571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1978).
103. 454 F. Supp. 643 (D. Md. 1978).
104. The rights asserted in Sincox and Graham are truth-furthering in the sense that
they increase the accuracy of the trier-of-fact's determination that an individual in fact committed the crime for which he was convicted. See notes 57-59 supra.
105. The fact that the Court in Sykes rejected the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that
prejudice was "inherent" in the state prisoner's Miranda claim is not inconsistent with this
Stone approach insofar as a Miranda claim is not a truth-furthering right.
106. A per se approach to analyzing actual prejudice is not necessarily inconsistent with
Sykes, even though the Court there reversed the lower court which had found actual
prejudice inherent in petitioner's claim. It is significant that, while the lower court characterized petitioner's claim as an involuntary statement, 528 F.2d at 524-25, the Supreme
Court recharacterized it as a Miranda violation, 433 U.S. at 74-75. Although an involuntary
confession is probably per se harmful, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978),
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967); but see Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S.
371, 372 (1972) (Court applies harmless-error analysis to habeas petition alleging involuntary confession and violation of sixth amendment rights), it is doubtful that a Mirandaviolation enjoys the same status. Accordingly, the fact that the lower court in Sykes was reversed
on its per se approach to actual prejudice may simply reflect the fact the Supreme Court
took a different view of the type of claim there presented. But see Robertson v. Collins, Civ.
No. Y-78-1544 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 1979).
107. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
108. Id. at 23. See note 64 supra.
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Sincox had a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment that if convicted at all it would be a valid, unanimous
jury verdict of guilt. He was adjudged guilty on the strength of an
invalid, eleven out of twelve verdict. He had an absolute right to
present that error on appeal and persistently asserted his desire to
appeal, yet0no
appeal was taken. The "prejudice" hurdle is quickly
9
overcome. 1
Moreover, the court in Graham expressly concluded that the harmlesserror doctrine was inapplicable to the claim there presented, that is, an
improper allocation of the burden of proof."0 Thus, Sincox and
Graham represent cases where results are consistent with both the
Stone distinction between truth-furthering rights and non-truth-furthering rights, and a per se harmless-error approach.
This survey of the lower court decisions reveals that the vast majority of courts have followed the lead of the Court in Sykes in applying a variant of harmless-error analysis to define actual prejudice. That
the Sykes Court left open for future resolution the precise definition of
actual prejudice, however, has permitted other courts to explore different approaches to defining the term. One court has applied the more
rigorous "colorable showing of innocence" requirement. Still other
courts have found actual prejudice in cases involving claims that may
be viewed either as truth-furthering rights under Stone v. Powell or as
per se harmful under the exception to Chapman v. Calfornia. None of
these approaches is inconsistent with Sykes, but each may yield different results in a given case. It remains, therefore, for the Supreme Court
to resolve this conflict among the lower courts.
Cause
The other prong of the Sykes waiver standard bars habeas review
in a procedural default case unless the petitioner can show "cause" for
not raising his claim in accordance with state procedural rules. The
Sykes decision, however, offers scant guidance in defining cause. The
Court's observation that "[r]espondent has advanced no explanation
whatever for his failure to object at trial [to the testimony offered by the
police officers]," 1" reveals only that the habeas petitioner bears the
burden of showing cause.
The concept of cause focuses on why the petitioner failed to raise
his claim in accordance with state procedures and whether those reasons are sufficient to excuse the petitioner's procedural default. Thus,
109. 571 F.2d at 879.
110. 454 F. Supp. at 651.

111.

433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
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one court has defined cause as "a reasonable and valid explanation [for
failure to comply with a state rule] other than a tactical decision to
forego the available avenue of redress."' " 2 The classic example of
cause is the situation in which a defendant could not have discovered
the factual predicate for a legal claim at the time the claim should have
been asserted." 3 It is difficult to imagine a more reasonable and valid
explanation for a procedural default than the unavailability of the evidence underlying a claim.
This section addresses a more complex issue: what, if any, attorney
conduct will constitute a reasonable and valid explanation for a failure
to abide by a procedural rule? That the lower federal courts have focused on this particular problem is a predictable outgrowth of Sykes,
for a major foundation of the Court's decision was the majority's desire
to deter "sandbagging,"' 14 that is, the reasoned decision of an attorney
to delay raising a constitutional claim on behalf of his client for tactical
purposes.
The majority did not explicitly address itself, however, to the question of whether an attorney's excusable or inadvertant conduct should
be treated in the same manner as a tactical decision or whether such
conduct is a reasonable and valid explanation for the procedural default. A habeas petitioner will inevitably suggest that he is being
treated unfairly unless such behavior is deemed to be cause for his failure to raise a claim. In resolving this issue, a court is compelled to
address itself to the legal and policy reasons for "binding" a defendant
to his attorney's conduct.
112. Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643, 648 (D. Md. 1978).
113. Two Rule 12 cases illustrate the point. A panel in the Second Circuit held that a
defendant did not waive his right to make a motion to suppress evidence where the prosecution had "failed to disclose to [the defendant] his intention to introduce the evidence required by [Rule 12d] and [had violated] the understanding that all evidence discoverable
under Rule 16 would be turned over" to the defendant at the time the defendant's me'ion
should have been made. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 417 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978). In
dictum, another federal court excused a waiver of a claim based on grand jury proceedings
where the defendant could not have raised the claim prior to trial because he had not yet
received a transcript of the grand jury proceedings. But the court held that the defendant's
failure to raise the claim during trial once he received a copy of the transcript was a waiver
under Rule 12. United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 970 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 956 (1978).
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Shortwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 36263 (1963) held that cause did not exist because the "facts concerning the selection of the
grand and petit juries were notorious and available to petitioners in the exercise of due
diligence before the trial." See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra. See also Arnold v.
Wainwright, 516 F.2d 964, 971 n. 11(5th Cir. 1975) (availability of information is a key
factor in finding cause under Rule 12), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
114. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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Policy Considerations

The opinions in Sykes reveal two rationales for so binding a
habeas petitioner. The first views the criminal defendant as the principal responsible for the actions of his agent, the trial lawyer. 15 The
theory is that "the lack of skill and incompetency of the attorney is
imputed to the defendant who employed him, the acts of the attorney
becoming those of his client."1 6 Although some courts continue to embrace this agency rationale, 1 7 its applicability in a criminal context has
been attacked by a leading commentator who has articulated two reasons why the rationale fails to portray accurately the relationship between a criminal defendant and his attorney. First, the basic tenet of
agency law evolved in order to protect an innocent third party from an
agent's representations. In criminal cases, however, "there is no innocent beneficiary of the accused's agency-born liability for the ineptitude
of his retained attorney-agent," and secondly, a criminal defendant is
usually incapable of performing the normal role of the principal by
supervising his agent, the attorney."18 Second, an agency relationship
assumes the presence of a principal who is capable of supervising his
agent. A criminal defendant, however, is usually not equipped to exert
the requisite direction." 9 The procedural posture of a procedural default case exacerbates the general inability of a criminal defendant to
supervise his attorney. Even a defendant who participates in the formulation of his defense and who is cognizant of rights personal to him
is less likely to be well acquainted with procedural rules mandating
waivers due to attorney inaction. 120 Thus, the agency rationale appears
particularly inapplicable as a justification for binding a habeas petitioner to his attorney's conduct.
The second rationale evidenced in Sykes for binding a criminal
defendant to the acts of counsel focuses on the needs of the adversary
system. 121 That system is premised on the view that truth is best dis115. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 114 n.13 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,324 U.S. 869 (1945).
117.

See, e.g., Gallup v. State, 559 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wyo. 1977); State v. Hall, 554 P.2d

755 (Mont. 1976).
118.

Waltz, Inadequacy ofTrial Defense Representationas a GroundforPost-Conviction

Relie/in CriminalCases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289, 297 (1964).
119.

Id.

120. Chief Justice Burger has noted that "it is because ' "[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law"' that we held it constitutionally required that every defendant who faces the possibility of incarceration be
afforded counsel." 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
121. Id.at 93-94 (Burger, C.., concurring); id. at 114 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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covered and justice best meted out through a process in which each
party bears the burden of investigating and presenting its case before
an impartial tribunal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has stated that
trial-type decisions must be left in the hands of counsel who have the
authority to make tactical decisions. 22 In his Sykes concurrence, Chief
Justice Burger contended that a defendant's inability to exercise the
expertise provided by trial counsel and the practical difficulties of interrupting a trial to insure that a client fully agrees with each tactical decision support this grant of authority to trial counsel. 123 Yet the
conclusion that an attorney must be free to make tactical decisions at
trial does not offer a full explanation of the reasons why a criminal
defendant should always be held accountable for his attorney's inadvertance or error.
The decision to hold that a criminal defendant must be bound to
his attorney's conduct cannot be separated from the larger issue of the
availability of habeas corpus in federal courts to attack prior state convictions. If a civil defendant is found liable for money damages in a
breach of contract action because of his lawyer's negligence, the defendant can be made whole by instituting a successful malpractice suit.
A criminal defendant who suffers from his lawyer's negligence has no
equivalent remedy because even a successful malpractice action will
not result in his freedom. Any meaningful remedy derives from a collateral attack on the judgment. This too differs from the civil context,
in which no collateral attack is available against a winning party because of error or misconduct engaged in by the losing party's counsel.
These obvious distinctions between civil and criminal litigation suggest
that while the needs of the adversary system may predominate in one
context, they may be outweighed by the need for collateral attack in
another.
The primary concerns in defining the scope of collateral attack are
the state interest in finality, judicial efficiency, and federalism, on the
one hand, 124 and the habeas petitioner's right to vindicate his innocence, on the other. 25 Consider the case of a habeas petitioner who
demonstrates that his attorney, acting negligently but within the
122.

See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.

443, 451 (1965).
123.

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also id.

at 95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
124. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-90 (1977); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 259-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
125. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,491 n.31 (1977); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 256-68 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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bounds of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel, failed to adhere to a state procedural rule, and thus did not present a meritorious
claim that the petitioner had been denied his constitutional right to a
fair and impartial petit jury. Assuming that the petitioner has demonstrated actual prejudice, the question posed is whether the petitioner's
interest in redressing unjust incarceration is outweighed by the need of
the adversary system to bind clients to the conduct of their lawyers and
the state interest in finality, judicial efficiency, and federalism. Whichever way the question is resolved, the cause test has suddenly become
the fulcrum of deciding whether a possibly innocent person should be
permitted to procure relief for violation of his constitutional rights.
The lower federal courts applying Sykes can resolve the tension
between the defendant's interest and the combined demands of the adversary system and the state's interests in one of two ways. First, courts
may ignore the defendant's interest and focus solely on whether the
needs of the adversary system along with the state's interests are served
by classifying a certain type of attorney conduct as cause. This approach treats the cause factor as an inquiry exclusively into whether the
attorney's conduct is a valid and reasonable explanation for a procedural default. Such an inquiry would not take into account the defendant's interest no matter how compelling, relegating it instead to the
actual prejudice portion of the cause-and-prejudice test. Second, courts
may consider the defendant's interest along with the state's interests
and the needs of the adversary system, and relax the preclusive effect of
the cause requirement if the defendant may be unjustly incarcerated.
This approach, although avoiding the possibility that an innocent person could be kept in prison because his attorney erred, transforms
cause from half of a conjunctive test into a factor that assesses whether
social justice would be served by barring consideration of the habeas
petitioner's constitutional claims on the merits.
The Lower Court Decisions

The recent decisions of the lower federal courts applying the Sykes
test generally speak the language of the first approach outlined above,
but the results of the cases generally reflect the second approach. Court
opinions treating cause as a factor that looks only to the needs of the
adversary system and the state interest in finality have disagreed
sharply over what, if any, constitutionally effective attorney conduct
provides a reasonable and valid explanation for a procedural default.
But the same decisions, when viewed from the vantage point of the
second approach, which considers the defendant's interest in securing
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relief from unjust incarceration, form a more consistent pattern. The
decisions show that the types of attorney conduct that constitute cause
significantly expand if a habeas petitioner presents the spectre of con-

tinuing unjust incarceration.
Cause Defined Solely in Terms of Attorney Conduct
A survey of the recent decisions that have applied Sykes reveals
that a lawyer's failure to raise a claim may constitute cause if the attorney's conduct was (1) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel,
(2) excusable because the lawyer either acted negligently or because no
lawyer could reasonably have been expected to raise the claim, or (3)
not in fact a strategic decision.
An attorney's strategic or tactical decision not to raise a claim will
not constitute cause,126 but a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel
will. This issue arose in Sincox v. United States,127 where a federal
prisoner sought to vacate his conviction on the ground that he had been
denied the right to a unanimous jury trial. Trial counsel had neither
raised this claim at trial nor filed an appeal in spite of the prisoner's
requests that he do so. The court in Sincox characterized the attorney's
actions as constituting denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel and found that Sykes cause existed. 2 8 Similarly, in Rinehart v.
Brewer,12 9 the Eighth Circuit found ineffective assistance of counsel
one ground for its holding that the petitioner had shown cause for his
failure to bring the claim of an involuntary guilty plea to the attention
130
of the trial court.
126. Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443, 446 (4th Cir. 1978); Rodriguez v. Estelle,
536 F.2d 1096, 1097 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hearst, No. CR-74-364 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
7, 1978). In the two circuit court cases the courts found that the procedural error that constituted a Sykes waiver was also a deliberate by-pass under Fay v. Noia. These findings may
support Justice White's belief that "the deliberate by-pass rule of Fay v. Noia affords adequate protection to the State's interest in insisting that defendants not flout the rules of
evidence." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 98 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
127. 571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1978).
128. Id. at 879-80.
129. 561 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1977).
130. Id. at 130 n.6. See also Salter v. Johnson, 579 F.2d 1007, 1009 (6th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting appellant's contentions that trial counsel's ineffective assistance caused noncompliance with procedural rule because the trial counsel was not ineffective); Strazella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARiZ. L. REv. 443, 478
(1977). But cf. Porter v. Leeke, 457 F. Supp. 253, 259-60 n.7 (D.S.C. 1978).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may therefore serve double duty, standing
both as an independent claim of a constitutional violation and cause for failure to assert any
other claim not raised due to ineffective counsel. However, not every ineffectiveness claim
will establish cause-for example if the asserted ineffectiveness at trial was not raised on
appeal by a different lawyer representing the defendant-and not every instance of cause
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The eleven circuit courts of appeals have adopted different standards to define ineffective assistance of counsel. The First, Second, and

Tenth Circuits continue to measure ineffectiveness claims by the traditional "mockery-of-justice" formula.' 3 ' The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits have assured each criminal defendant counsel "reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance."' 132 The

Third and Eighth Circuits have held that an attorney in a criminal trial
must exercise "the customary skill and knowledge which normally

prevails at the time and place."'

33

These varying standards have made it difficult, in the abstract, to
predict whether a single instance of lawyer failure to raise a claim pursuant to a state procedural requirement will constitute ineffective assist-

ance of counsel. Under either the Third and Eighth Circuit's
"community standards" approach or the Fifth Circuit's "reasonable
lawyer" rule, courts review "all aspects of defense counsel's assistance
to the accused."' 34 Thus, lawyer conduct that may constitute ineffective assistance in one context, may not in another. In United States v.
Easter,3 5 where trial counsel failed to object to the legality of a police

search of the defendant's home and the seizure of a shotgun found during the search, the court held that a single lawyer error amounted to

ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding the attorney's conduct so
"derelict" as to constitute ineffective assistance,136 the court noted that

counsel must assert a claim that may be his client's only defense, particularly "when that defense has a factual basis and there is a recognized
and obvious means to suppress evidence which has allegedly been illedue to attorney conduct demands a showing of constitutionally ineffective counsel. See text
accompanying notes 141-179 infra.
131. See United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1360 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378, 1385
(10th Cir. 1976).
132. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Beasly v. United States, 491
F.2d 687, 693-96 (6th Cir. 1976); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974).
133. United States v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1976); United States v. Easter, 539
F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,433 U.S. 844 (1977). The remaining circuits use a
variety of standards. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his client's conscientious advocate); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977) (whether defense counsel's
representation is "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases"); United States v. Warden, 545 F.2d 21, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1976) (a minimum standard of
professional representation).
134. Note, Ineffective Representation as a BasisforRelie from Conviction: Princilesfor
Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J. oF L. & SoC. PROB. 1, 41 (1977).
135. 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 844 (1977).
136. Id. at 665.
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137

gally seized."'
A class of cases exists, however, in which attorney error does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, the Fifth Circuit in McDonald v. Estelle, 38 held that an attorney's failure to object
to the introduction of prior uncounseled convictions at the punishment
phase of a trial did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, even though the introduction of such evidence did constitute reversible error. 139 Similarly, the court in Arnold v. Wainwright found
that although trial counsel had not been reasonably diligent in investi40
gating a claim, their error did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Federal courts thus have evaluated whether constitutionally effective attorney conduct will provide cause for failure to raise a claim either based on whether it is excusable when compared to the behavior of
other attorneys or because it is nonstrategic. The suggestion that certain attorney conduct may be "excusable," thereby allowing litigation
of the constitutional claim, originates in the Sykes Court's citation with
approval of Justice Powell's earlier concurrence in Estelle v.
Williams. 14 1 In Williams, a majority of the Court held that a state defendant's due process rights are infringed if he is compelled to appear
at trial wearing prison clothes but not if he appears in prison garb without objection. 142 Justice Powell took a different tack. He proposed that
a state court conviction should be left standing if the defendant "has
made an 'inexcusable procedural default' in failing to object at a time
when a substantive right could have been protected."'' 43 Applying the
test to the facts under review, Justice Powell found that the due process
claim had not been raised because Williams' attorney believed, incorrectly, that an objection would have been futile. In fact, the state trial
court judge had allowed defendants to stand trial in civilian clothing if
they wished, and both the state courts and the federal court of appeals
for that state had recognized that trial in prison clothing could be considered constitutional error. 144
137. Id. at 666.
138. 536 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated and remandedfor consideration in light of
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 904 (1977), remandedfor consideration of "cause," 564 F.2d

199 (5th Cir. 1977).
139.
140.
141.
note 14
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 670-72.
516 F.2d 964, 971 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
425 U.S. 501, 513 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), cited in 433 U.S. at 89 n.13. See
supra.
425 U.S. at 512-13.
Id. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice Powell's "inexcusable procedural default" test was origi-

nally proposed by Professor Henry Hart prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Fay v. Noia.145 Professor Hart criticized the state of the law
that allowed state prisoners to relitigate in federal habeas court constitutional claims that had been considered by state courts, but barred
habeas review if an adequate and independent state procedural ground
would have precluded review of the constitutional claim on direct appeal to the Supreme Court.' 4 6 Nevertheless, Professor Hart believed
that the power of state courts to regulate their own procedure mandated that "[r]easonable consequences" flow from a failure to comply
with "reasonable procedural rules."' 147 Accordingly, he suggested that
"[t]here is room. . . for a distinct doctrine of inadvertant loss of [fed-

eral constitutional rights] by inexcusable procedural default."14s
Use of the "inexcusable procedural default" formulation to define
cause requires a definition of what sort of attorney conduct is excusable. The attempts of several courts to analyze an attorney's failure to

raise a claim in terms of a reasonableness test suggests two possibilities.' 49 The first is that cause is shown where an attorney has acted
unreasonably in not raising a claim. In Jiminez v. Estelle, 50 a panel of

the Fifth Circuit suggested in dicta that a habeas petitioner, by demonstrating that his lawyer knew of the facts underlying his claim and that

any reasonable attorney so apprised would have raised the claim, could
145. Hart, The Supreme Court,1958 Term-Forward"The Time Chart ofthe Justices,73
HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
146. "Apart from the difficulty of reconciling Brown v. Allen and Daniels v. Allen in
terms of the felt sense ofjustice, the distinction between the two cases. . . puts pressure on
the state judicial systems in exactly the wrong direction. It tells the state courts that the more
liberal they are in considering the federal constitutional claims of state prisoners on the
merits the more freely they will be subjected to the delays and the indignity, as it is often felt
to be, of federal-court review of their decisions, whereas the more astute they are to lay
procedural traps for criminal defendants the surer they will be of immunizing their decisions
from federal examination." Id. at 118.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Although the courts that have found certain attorney conduct to be excusable have
not directly addressed the issue of whether strategic decisions may be excusable, the notion
of a reasonableness test suggests that the distinction between strategic and nonstrategic behavior may not control the "excusable" issue. See 433 U.S. at 99 (White, J., concurring) (an
attorney's decision not to raise a claim of which he is aware will not constitute a deliberate
by-pass unless the failure to raise a claim "is sufficiently egregious to demonstrate that the
services of counsel were not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)"). But Vf. United States v.
Hearst, No. CR-74-364 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 1978) (a defense counsel's tactical choice cannot
serve as the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
150. 557 F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir. 1977).
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show Sykes cause for his lawyer's failure to object to the introduction
at trial of prior uncounseled convictions. The court also noted that insofar as the lawyer had objected to the introduction of the evidence on
other grounds, petitioner could demonstrate that counsel's failure to
object was not strategic. The particularity with which the court detailed the course of such a claim indicates that the Jiminez court would
hold it to satisfy the Sykes cause standard. At least two courts have
read Jiminez in this fashion 5 and two others have specifically stated
152
that similarly unreasonable attorney conduct is cause.
The leading case to suggest that unreasonable attorney conduct
53
will not constitute cause was handed down in Arnold v. Wainwright'
by a different panel of the Fifth Circuit. The court in Arnold held that
a state prisoner who had failed to assert his right under state law to
challenge the selection of the petit jury was barred from seeking habeas
corpus relief on the waived claim. Although the court specifically declined to find that the prisoner's trial counsel had been constitutionally
ineffective, the court affirmed the district court's finding that counsel
did not exercise reasonable diligence in investigating the possibility of a
claim based on unconstitutional jury selection procedures. 154 Nevertheless, the court refused to accept the view that an attorney's failure to
exercise reasonable diligence should relieve a petitioner from the effect
of the error. The court justified its decision by explaining that enforcement of the state procedural default would (1) induce attorneys to pursue more vigorous investigations of their clients' legal claims, 55 (2)
encourage the litigation of all claims during a single judicial proceed56
ing, and (3) further ensure the finality of criminal judgments.
Underlying the Arnold decision is the assumption that a judicially
imposed forfeiture of constitutional rights, even for failure of an attorney to exercise reasonable diligence, will deter future attorney error.
This assumption rests upon the familiar principle of tort law that a reasonable standard of care may impose a greater duty than the prevailing
151. See Porter v. Leeke, 457 F. Supp. 253,259 n.7 (D.S.C. 1978); Cole v. Stevenson, 447
F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
152. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Collins
v. Auger, 451 F. Supp. 22, 28 (S.D. Iowa 1977), vacated and remanded,577 F.2d 1107 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1979).
153. 516 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,426 U.S. 908 (1976). The court in Arnold

applied the waiver standard of Davis v. United States, see text accompanying notes 11-13
supra,precursor of the Sykes test, to a habeas petition brought by state prisoners. Id. at 967.
154. Id. at 971.
155. Id. at 971 & n.12.
156. Id.
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practice or custom. For example, Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
The TJ Hooper,157 cited in Arnold v. Wainwright, 5B held that tugboat
operators acted unreasonably in not carrying radio receiving equipment, even though such equipment was not commonly used at the time
of the decision.159 Similarly, Arnold v. Wainwright may stand for the
proposition that the Sykes test is designed not only to foreclose deliberate by-pass, but also to induce attorneys to act more carefully in assessing their clients' possible claims.
The deterrent effect assumed in Arnold has two corollary principles: that courts are not treating criminal defendants unjustly by refusing to hear habeas petitions in order to improve the performance of
lawyers in general; and that courts, by so doing, will garner a level of
deterrence higher than would otherwise be achieved. Justice Brennan,
for one, disputes the second assumption. He suggested in his Sykes
dissent that the forfeiture of state remedies and direct review in the
United States Supreme Court sufficiently encourages attorneys to upgrade the quality of their representation without the need for forfeiture
60
of habeas corpus relief.'
The second possibility for defining cause in terms of a reasonableness standard is found in cases holding that cause is shown when an
attorney's failure to raise a claim conforms completely with the expected and reasonable behavior of the bar. The approach is similar to
the classic formulation of cause enunciated in Rule 12 cases-cause is
shown when a defendant could not be expected to have discovered the
factual predicate for a legal claim at the time the claim should have
been presented. 16' Here, however, the factual predicate is clear, but the
legal basis for the claim is not.
In Cole v. Stevenson, 162 a state prisoner was convicted of second
degree murder after a jury trial and his conviction was affirmed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in 1971. Three years later, the
Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur 163 held unconstitutional a state
157. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
158. See 516 F.2d at 971 n.12.
159. Judge Hand wrote: "There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the
Indeed in most cases
general practice of the calling the standard of proper diligence ....
reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole
Courts
calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices ....
must in the end say what it required; there are precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their omission." 60 F.2d at 740.
160. See 433 U.S. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. See note 113 & accompanying text supra.
162. 447 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
163. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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law imposing on a criminal defendant the burden of proof in reducing
a murder charge to manslaughter. In 1977, the Supreme Court in
Hankerson v. North Carolina 64 applied Mullaney retroactively. After
both cases were decided, Cole filed a petition for habeas corpus relief
alleging that he had been forced to shoulder evidentiary burdens inconsistent with Mullaney. The district court, assuming for the purposes of
decision that Cole's objections to the burden of proof jury instructions
should have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal, considered
whether cause existed.
The court noted that Justice Powell, in his Williams concurrence,
had emphasized that the policies underlying the availability of habeas
corpus "need not be carried to the length of allowing counsel for a
defendant deliberately to forego objection to a curable trial defect, even
though he is aware of the factual and legal basis for an objection, simply because he thought objection would be futile."'16 5 In the court's
view, Justice Powell's concurrence "[could] be interpreted as necessitating an attorney have knowledge of his client's right and purposefully or
erroneously not except to its violation."' 66 The court observed that at
the time of Cole's trial in North Carolina, the bar "had no inkling" that
the state's standard jury instructions were constitutionally invalid, and
that "few, if any attorneys" would have seen reason to object. There
was, therefore, "no deliberation, no awareness and no tactical choice"
underlying failure to raise the Mullaney claim. Accordingly, the court
held that cause exists where a constitutional violation "not perceived by
167
the bar or bench" was foregone.
The district court's opinion in Cole v. Stevenson is significant in
two respects. First, it suggests that attorney conduct is not excusable
under Justice Powell's formulation if the lawyer knew of the claim but
negligently failed to raise it. Second, it holds that an attorney's reasonable lack of knowledge of a constitutional claim is cause. Cole v.
Stevenson may not be compelled by Justice Powell's concurrence, but it
is at least not barred by it. Williams' counsel, "fully aware" of the
164.

432 U.S. 233 (1977).

165. 447 F. Supp. at 1273 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 515 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
166. 447 F. Supp. at 1273.
167. Id.;accord,Robertson v. Collins, Civ. No. Y-78-1544, slip op. at 9 (D. Md. Feb. 23,
1979); Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643, 648-49 (D. Md. 1978); Bromwell v. Williams,
445 F. Supp. 106, 114 (D. Md. 1977). See also Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d 887, 894 (6th Cir.

1978) (Merrit, J., concurring) (cause exists where "neither the defendant nor his attorney
could reasonably have been expected to know or appreciate the legal significance of the facts
upon which the objection was based.").
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prison clothes issue, did not raise it because he believed the claim

would be unsuccessful. 168 Cole's counsel, by contrast, apparently
neither knew, nor should have known, of the Mullaney claim.
Alternatively, some lower courts have focused not on whether the

attorney's conduct, in a comparative sense, was excusable, but on
whether, in fact, the attorney failed to raise a claim for nonstrategic

reasons.

69

These courts begin with the assumption that inadvertant

attorney conduct is not at the heart of the Supreme Court's concern

with "sandbagging." Attorneys who inadvertantly fail to raise a claim
are, by definition, not taking "their chances on a verdict of not guilty in
a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a

federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off."'

70

Fur-

ther, two members of the Sykes Court suggested that Sykes' counsel

may have acted for strategic purposes. 171 Accordingly, these courts
have concluded that Sykes does not preclude the possibility that inadvertant attorney conduct is cause.
For example, the court in Collins v. Auger172 noted that the Sykes
court left "the impression that the possibility that defense counsel failed
to object. . . as a part of trial strategy weighed heavily in the decision
that there was no cause." 17 3 In the Collins case, the habeas petitioner

alleged that he had been denied due process by the trial court's admis168. See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.
169. A theoretical distinction exists between nonstrategic and inadvertant defaults because an attorney may make an advertant decision not to raise a claim for nonstrategic
purposes. Thus, a decision not to raise a seemingly frivolous claim is clearly advertant, yet it
is not expected to yield strategic benefits. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
98-99 (1977) (White, J., concurring). For the purposes of this Article, the terms "inadvertant" and "nonstrategic" are used interchangeably, because it appears that appellate
court judges reviewing attorney conduct will search the trial record for strategic purposes
that might have motivated the attorney conduct, rather than ask whether the attorney conduct was, in fact, advertant or inadvertant. See id. at 96 (Stevens, J., concurring) ('The
record persuades me that competent trial counsel could well have made a deliberate decision
not to object to the admission of [Sykes'] in-custody statement."); Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 508 (1976) ("[Ijnstances frequently arise where a defendant prefers to stand trial
before his peers in prison garments. The cases show, for example, that it is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes in hope of eliciting sympathy
from the jury."); id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring) ("As is frequently the case with such trialtype rights as that involved here, counsel's failure to object in itself is susceptible of interpretation as a tactical choice.").
170. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
171. See, e.g., id. at 93 n.2 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 96-97 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see id. at 104-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. 451 F. Supp. 22 (1977), vacatedandremandedon othergrounds,577 F.2d 1107 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1979).
173. Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
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sion of psychiatric testimony disclosing inculpatory statements made by
petitioner. Although trial counsel had objected to the testimony on
three grounds, 74 he had not raised the due process objection. Nevertheless, the court found the attorney's failure, which resulted from his
ignorance of the possible constitutional objection, to be cause. 75
Significantly, the Collins court, unlike the court in Cole v. Stevenson,
did not inquire into the reasonableness of the attorney's conduct. The
Collins test is accordingly a less stringent standard.
Several judges, however, have rejected the view that nonstrategic
attorney conduct will constitute cause. 176 To accept that view, the court
in Porter v. Leeke 177 noted, would mean "every time a defendant's attorney failed to object . . . the defendant could assert that his attorney's ignorance of the need for an objection was 'sufficient' cause to
avoid the Wainwright v. Sykes bar. This Court does not feel that the
exception should be allowed to swallow the rule." This position derives
support from both the rationale of Arnold v. Wainwright that use of the
cause test can prevent future forfeiture, and the observation of Professor Hart that some inadvertant forfeitures rightfully preclude review.
The danger that the exception will vitiate the rule emphasizes the difficulty in administering a cause standard that depends on whether an
attorney's behavior is, in fact, nonstrategic. 'Although the Porter court
was apparently concerned that all attorney inaction could be characterized as nonstrategic, it is at least as likely that the opposite would be
true. An attorney testifying at a habeas corpus hearing may well attempt to protect his professional reputation and foreclose incipient
malpractice actions by justifying even truly nonstrategic actions as intentional. In the absence of attorney testimony the availability of
174. Trial counsel argued that introduction of the psychiatrist's testimony violated the
doctor-patient privilege, Miranda,and the hearsay rule. Id. at 25.
175. Id. at 27-28. In affirming the district court's finding of cause, the Eighth Circuit
specifically agreed that the trial counsel's failure "was not a matter of trial strategy, but was
the result of counsel's unawareness of the due process violation," 577 F.2d at 1110 n.2, and

met the test for cause. Id. at 1110. The court in Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643, 648
(D. Md. 1978), similarly found that cause existed for failure to raise a Mullaney claim where
a state prisoner acting pro se was unaware of Mullane/s due process principle. The court
stated that "tactical gamesmanship is certainly non-existent here. Petitioner had absolutely

nothing to gain by holding this issue in reserve [during earlier post-collateral attacks on his
state court conviction.]" Id. at 649.
176. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 843 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Oakes, J.,
concurring); Brawer v. United States, No. 78 Civ. 3513 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1978); Porter v.

Leeke, 457 F. Supp. 253, 259-60 n.7 (D.S.C. 1978); Ramsey v. United States, 448 F. Supp.
1264, 1272 (N.D. 11. 1978); United States v. Underwood, 440 F. Supp. 499, 502 (D.R.I.
1977).
177.

457 F. Supp. 253, 259-60 n.7 (D.S.C. 1978).
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habeas corpus relief may turn on how a court assesses, on the basis of a
written record, an attorney's motivation for inaction. 78 Either a reasonableness test, which compares attorney behavior to an accepted
norm regardless of the individual attorney's intent, or the exclusion of
nonstrategic behavior from the definition of cause would avoid this judicial burden.
In sum, the lower federal courts apparently agree that ineffective
assistance of counsel is cause for failure to raise a claim. The courts
have split sharply, however, when they have considered what, if any,
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel provides a reasonable
and valid explanation for a procedural default. By comparing the behavior of the habeas petitioner's attorney to the behavior of attorneys
as a whole, some courts have suggested that cause exists when an attorney acts negligently or when he fails to raise a claim that no reasonable
lawyer would have raised. Other courts have focused solely on whether
the attorney's behavior was nonstrategic, while both the reasonableness
approach, similar in nature to the "inexcusable procedural default"
test, and the nonstrategic analysis have been rejected by still other
courts interpreting Sykes.
Cause as a Balancing of Three Interests
If cause is a factor that considers only the needs of the adversary
system and the state interest in finality, judicial efficiency and federalism, then the lower court decisions applying Sykes are hopelessly irreconcilable. Two courts, however, have considered the defendant's
interest in securing release from unjust incarceration in defining the
cause test even though the justice of continued confinement does not
logically speak to the causes of a procedural default. 179 Their decisions
find precedent in two Rule 12 cases in which courts found "cause
shown" where defendants presented ample evidence of prejudice but
provided no explanation for their failure to abide by state
procedures.' 8 0
178. See note 169 supra.
179. Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Underwood, 440 F. Supp. 449, 502 (D.R.I. 1977).
180. In United States v. Wasson, 568 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1978), the court vindicated a
defendant's claim that she was prejudiced by joinder of her trial for possession of stolen
property with co-defendants, even though the defendant gave no explanation for failing to
ask for a severance prior to or during trial: "Under the circumstances of this case, co-defendant Littrel brought to the trial court's attention the possibility of prejudice by his motion for
severance and the trial court denied that motion as it would have Wasson's. Because the
trial court has a continuing duty to be on the lookout for possible prejudice, and the jury's
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In fact, a survey of the early cases analyzing what attorney conduct
constitutes cause suggests that courts define cause expansively when
they confront the possibility of "unjust incarceration," but define cause
more narrowly when a habeas petition does not appeal to their sense of
justice. Although it is difficult to define precisely the term "unjust incarceration," courts have found constitutionally effective attorney conduct to be cause in cases involving violations of due process under
Mullaney v. Wilbur,'8 ' the deprivation of the right to an impartial
jury, 8 2 the right to have uncounselled convictions excluded from use at
a later trial, 83 the due process assertion that, as a matter of state law,
the petitioner is innocent, 84 and the violation of due process by the
introduction of inculpatory statements made to an examining psychiatrist. 185 Courts apparently have defined cause more narrowly when the
petitioner has not shown either actual prejudice 86 or the existence of a
constitutional violation,18 7 or when he has asserted the violation of a
188
non-truth-furthering right.
If the existence of possible injustice influences the showing necessary to establish cause, then it may be deceptive to view the cause-andverdict in this case made the existence of actual prejudice apparent, we find that in the
interests of justice, Wasson's judgment of conviction should be reversed and her case remanded for a new trial." Id. at 1223. See also United States v. Shackleford, 180 F. Supp.
857 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (where an indictment was duplicitous by charging more than one crime
in the same count, and the defendant would be prejudiced by the duplicity, the court found
no waiver even though the defendant failed to raise the duplicity issue before trial). See
generally Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (in a trial for World War II
treason, the court reached the merits of two claims without finding cause for failure to raise
the claims at trial).
181. See Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643 (D. Md. 1978); Cole v. Stevenson, 447
F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.C. 1978). See also Robertson v. Collins, Civ. No. Y-78-1544, slip op.
at 9, 15 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 1979) (cause defined expansively where petitioner failed to bring a
Mullaney v. Wilbur claim because "[t]he full implication of Winshiv was not and could not
have been apparent. . . at the time of [the petitioner's] trial," even though petitioner failed
to establish actual prejudice because of the substantial evidence of his guilt).
182. See Bromwell v. Williams, 445 F. Supp. 106 (D. Md. 1977).
183. See Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
184. See Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1978) (Merrit, J., concurring) (appellant innocent of charge of being a habitual offender because an earlier conviction violated
due process and thus became unavailable for late enhancement purposes).
185. Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107 (1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan.
22, 1979).
186. See Arnold v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Robertson v.
Collins, Civ. No. Y-78-1544 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 1979); note 181 supra.
187. See Brawer v. United States, No. 78 Civ. 3513 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1978); Porter v.
Leeke, 457 F. Supp. 253 (D.S.C. 1978); Ramsey v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D.
Ill. 1978).
188. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Oakes, J.,
concurring); United States v. Underwood, 440 F. Supp. 499 (D.R.I. 1977).
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prejudice test as two independent inquiries. Justice Stevens' evaluation
in Sykes of the cause-and-prejudice test suggests this conclusion:
The notion that a client must always consent to a tactical decision not
to assert a constitutional objection to a proffer of evidence has always
seemed unrealistic to me. Conversely, if the constitutional issue is
sufficiently grave, even an express waiver by the defendant may
sometimes be excused. Matters such as the competence of counsel,
the procedural context in which the asserted waiver occurred, the
character of the constitutional right at stake and the overall fairness
of the proceeding, may be more significant than the language of the
test the Court purports to apply. 1 9
The cases collected by Justice Stevens' 9 0 to demonstrate the operation
of Fay's deliberate by-pass standard illustrate the same point. Courts
have been willing to hold that failure to raise a claim constitutes deliberate by-pass where the habeas petitioner has not been harmed by the
error,' 9 ' but have not been willing to preclude habeas corpus relief
when the conviction rests on the basis of an illegal search,' 92 or when
the attorney made a tactical, but constitutionally incorrect, decision not
93
to allege that a confession had been coerced.
Notwithstanding the relevant Supreme Court language, the federal
courts appear to be employing a variable cause standard that shifts as
the courts weigh the defendant's interest in securing relief from unjust
incarceration, the state's interest in finality, judicial efficiency and fed189. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 94-96 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes
omitted).
190. Id. at 94 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
191. In Whitney v. United States, 513 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1974), the court found that trial
counsel conceded the validity of a consent search later challenged by a writ of habeas corpus
and that counsel "could have believed that if they unsuccessfully objected to the searches at
trial, they would have been admitting a possessory interest in the searched premises where
the contraband was found." Id. at 329. The court in United States v. Henderson, 462 F.2d
1125, 1129 (2d Cir. 1972), found that "it was the deliberate and consistent strategy of Terry's
counsel at his state murder trial not only not to question the voluntariness of his confession
but to use it affirmatively to support Terry's testimony of lack of any premeditated intent to
kill." In United States v. Rundle, 429 F.2d 791, 795 (3rd Cir. 1970), the court found that
defense counsel did not object to the introduction of an allegedly coerced confession "because they had concluded that the statement was admissible. This conclusion was no doubt
based in some measure on Broaddus' statement to his lawyers that he 'voluntarily gave
information.'"
192. See Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224, 1229 (8th Cir. 1971) (in its petition for rehearing the state admitted that "the search warrants authorizing the searches. . . were invalid, that the evidence obtained by those searches should have been suppressed, and that
without the unlawfully obtained evidence appellant could not have been convicted.").
193. See Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1969) ("A waiver could not result
from a deliberate choice of trial strategy based on an unwillingness to expose appellant to
the existent Texas procedure not then known to be unconstitutional" under Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)).
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eralism, and the needs of the adversary system. In so doing, the courts
have perhaps reverted to the original use of the term "cause shown"
provided by the Court in Shotwell.194 "It is entirely proper," the
Shotwell Court instructed, "to take the absence of prejudice into account in determining whether a sufficient showing has been made to
warrant relief from the effect of [Rule 12]."'19 - Use of a cause standard
that considers the possibility of unjust incarceration explains why it is
difficult, if not impossible, to predict whether a particular type of attorney conduct always will, or always will not, constitute cause. Although
such results appear inconsistent when measured against any definition
of cause that only looks to the reasonableness of the petitioner's explanation for failure to abide by a state rule, they may be entirely consistent with the balancing process that is involved in weighing the
defendant's interest, the state's interest, and the needs of the adversary
system. The results may also be consistent with the assurance of the
court in Sykes that the application of the cause-and-prejudice test
would not result in "a miscarriage of justice."'' 9 6
Conclusion
In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Supreme Court promulgated a new
waiver standard to govern the procedural default of a habeas petitioner's Miranda claim. The Court's cause-and-prejudice test thus displaces, at least for certain claims, the deliberate by-pass standard
adopted earlier by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia. Although the
Sykes Court applied the cause-and-prejudice test to the facts before it,
the Court did not elucidate the showing necessary to establish either
actual prejudice arising from a constitutional violation or cause for failure to raise a constitutional claim in accordance with state procedure.
A survey of the lower federal court cases applying the cause-andprejudice standard discloses substantial conflict in the definition and
application of those terms. The vast majority of courts defining actual
prejudice have used a variant of harmless-error analysis. One court,
however, has explicitly rejected the harmless-error approach and has
embraced the more rigorous "colorable showing of innocence" requirement. Still other courts have found actual prejudice in cases involving
claims that may be viewed either as truth-furthering rights or as per se
harmful error.
194. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
195. 371 U.S. 341, 363 (1963).
196. 433 U.S. at 91.
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Virtually all of the discussion of the meaning of cause has centered
on what, if any, attorney conduct will provide a habeas petitioner with
a reasonable and valid explanation for his failure to abide by a procedural rule. Although courts have generally agreed that constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause, they have split
sharply over whether cause is shown in cases involving attorney conduct that is in some sense "excusable" (either because the attorney acted negligently or because he failed to raise a claim no attorney would
have raised) or that is, in fact, nonstrategic. The cases may be more
consistent than they appear, however, because the courts that read
cause expansively have generally been confronted with facts that suggest the possibility of unjust incarceration. Even though unjust incarceration does not provide an explanation for failure to raise a claim,
courts may be more sympathetic to petitioners who, but for the presence of the cause requirement, could vindicate their innocence.
In sum, promulgation of the Sykes cause-and-prejudice test has
engendered considerable confusion and inconsistency among the lower
federal courts. Although the contours of the shift in policy from Fay v.
Noia to Sykes are clear, many of the details are not. In grappling with
the unresolved issues after Sykes, the lower federal courts have created
a substantial body of law that, while often contradictory, presents the
alternatives available to the Supreme Court in completing the design of
which Sykes is only one step.
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